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Abstract 
During the last three decades a notable increase in economic inequality is observed, 
accompanied by a decline in people's engagement in politics and electoral participation. 
This is an unsatisfactory phenomenon as it undermines the legitimacy of democratic 
representation. This negative association is produced by a complex salient mechanism. 
This study aims at investigating this issue. Using data from a panel of 28 OECD and 
European countries, this paper identifies the two-way causal relationship between 
inequality and political participation. The results show that greater income inequality 
alienates and discourages people from engaging with common affairs, thus leading to 
lower political participation. Yet, lower electoral participation leads towards a less 
equitable distribution of income. Hence, this study reveals a self-reinforcing mechanism 
where unequal distribution of income leads to political exclusion, which in turn leads 
to more inequality. 
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Inequality and participative democracy. A self-reinforcing 
mechanism 
 
“So long as the people do not care to exercise their freedom, those who wish to tyrannize will do so; 
for tyrants are active and ardent, and will devote themselves in the name of any number of gods, 
religious and otherwise, to put shackles upon sleeping men.” 
Voltaire 
Introduction 
The shape of the income distribution has changed markedly since 1980, with 
substantial gains in real income at the top outpacing much more modest gains among 
middle income earners. The economic models of Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggest that rising economic inequality leads those at the 
lower rungs of the income ladder to demand greater redistribution. Hence, it would be 
expected that governments responding to the increased political pressure would 
increase social transfers and welfare provisions with the aim to achieve a more 
egalitarian distribution of income. However, their prediction that inequality should 
induce higher welfare spending and higher redistribution is not supported by empirical 
evidence (Perotti 1993; 1996; Ramcharan 2010). Indeed, it has been well documented 
that economic inequality is increasing dramatically among citizens in many advanced 
countries (Piketty 2014), while welfare generosity has been steadily declining.  
 One strand of the literature explains why increasing economic inequality is not 
accompanied by policies of greater redistribution (Barth and Moene 2012; Benabou 
2000; Moene and Wallerstein 2001). This literature assumes that public opinion plays 
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a key role in the formulation of welfare policies. Thus, opinions of the public are found 
to be homogeneous and to follow a similar path over time. Furthermore, policy 
preferences of those at the lower and upper part of the income distribution are found 
to be highly correlated (Soroka and Wlezien 2008; Ura and Ellis 2008). Building on 
this, Kelly and Enns (2010) show that economic inequality is self-reinforcing because 
both the rich and poor become more conservative as inequality is rising. They argue 
that people in the top of the income distribution prefer lower redistribution, but with 
increasing inequality poor people also become discontented and less willing to pay 
higher taxes to finance a more generous welfare state. The homogeneity assumption in 
people’s response among different rungs of the income ladder and the conservative 
shift in preferences as economic inequality widens can explain why inequality has been 
steadily rising since the 1980s. Furthermore as Barth, Finseraas and Moene (2015) 
suggest, it is not only public sentiment that shifts to more conservativism in response to 
rising inequality, but also party politics on welfare issues move to the right, 
strengthening the impact of inequality. Both in their theoretical model and with their 
empirical findings highlight that the left wing political parties shift their political 
manifestos to the right and to less generous welfare spending.  
A parallel to the above strand of the literature highlights that unequal democratic 
representation and a class bias in the political agenda favours the preferences of the 
individuals in the highest rungs of income distribution (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2005; 
2011).  Bartels (2008) proposes that economic inequality becomes self-reinforcing as 
“increasing economic inequality may produce increasing inequality in political 
responsiveness, which in turn produces public policies that are increasingly detrimental 
to the interests of poor citizens, which in turn produces even greater inequality, and so 
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on.” (pp. 286). Gaventa (1980) and Lukes ([1974] 2005) argue persuasively that 
inequality induce frustration with the political process and thence apathy for those at 
the lower rungs of the income distribution. Hence, if economic inequality affects who 
votes, then elections outcomes may produce a biased sample of preferences towards 
those who vote, namely the higher rungs of the income distribution. “Democracy, thus 
constituted, does not even attain its ostensible object, that of giving the powers of 
government in all cases to the numerical majority. It does something very different: it 
gives them to a majority of the majority; who may be, and often are, but a minority of 
the whole.” (Mill 1861; pp.124) 
This highlights that economic inequality is related to political participation and 
therefore to the democratic legitimacy. This is an outcome of the fact that increasing 
unequal distribution of income – and wealth –are hindering the democratic system 
since economic inequality produces political inequality which in turn increases further 
the unequal distribution of income. Interestingly since 1980, the period of time where 
economic inequality has been steadily increasing, political participation has been 
declining, as reflected in the electoral participation. Franklin (2004) has observed that 
between the 1970s and the late 1990s participation rates have declined by an average of 
4.4 percent in a number of democratic states. Furthermore, recent evidence from the 
Comparative Political Data Set suggests a more significant reduction of voters’ turnout 
in parliamentary elections of roughly 13.5 percent from 1990 to 20111.  
                                                 
 
1 Authors’ calculations based on the Comparative Political Data Set III (1990-2011). 
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In light of the declining electoral participation and growing evidence on the 
inequities in the democratic system, this paper investigates the mechanism of the self-
reinforcing nature of economic inequality. Specifically, the paper explores whether 
there is a interrelationship between economic and political exclusion in a unified 
framework. Using data from 28 OECD and EU-member countries over the period 
1990-2011, the statistical analysis suggests that although wider political participation 
reduces economic inequality, economic inequality leads to political inactivity which in 
turn breeds further economic inequality. The findings offers an alternative explanation 
to that of  Kelly and Enns (2010) and Barth Finseraas and Moene (2015) by 
highlighting a mechanism through which economic inequality is self-reinforcing, as it 
propels political exclusion of the lower rungs of the income distribution.  
The relationship of economic equality and political participation 
A detailed review of the political theory regarding the effects of economic inequality 
and political participation is beyond the scope of this study. However, a brief literature 
review is presented below to highlight the relevant issues. From a theoretical perspective 
there are three competing theories on the relationship between economic inequality 
and political engagement and electoral participation.  
The conflict theory assumes that in democracy all individuals have the same political 
skills and power to influence the political agenda. The political outcomes are the 
product of the majority (Meltzer and Richard 1981) and therefore people’s preferences 
over the extent of redistribution depend on their individual financial circumstances. 
The poor want to redistribute wealth while the rich do not. Thus the extent of 
redistribution depends on the median voter’s preference, which is the decisive voter. 
The conflict theory suggests that higher economic inequality leads to greater electoral 
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participation because the conflict between the preferences of the rich and the poor will 
increase.  
In contrast, the relative power theory argues that it is rational for the poor to abstain 
from voting, since they already know they have a very low probability of influencing the 
political process (Goodin and Dryzek 1980; Lukes 2005). The political landscape is 
mainly shaped by the interests of the wealthier rungs of the society (Solt 2008). Hence, 
the poor lose interest in politics and refrain from participating. As a result there is a 
negative association between inequality and voter turnout. 
Overall, the literature (Schattschneider 1960; Goodin and Drysek 1980; Dahl 2006; 
Solt 2008) suggests that economic inequality reduces electoral participation. Goodin 
and Drysek (1980) point out that political power is highly determined by economic 
power thus the relatively poor are alienated from political participation. Nevertheless, 
recent studies (Brady 2004; Oliver 2007) argue that higher social inequality should be 
expected to increase political participation, because inequality entrenches the policy 
preferences of the poor and rich and therefore both groups become more militant than 
when inequality is moderate. Political theory suggests several mechanisms through 
which inequality pose an obstacle to political participation.  
Furthermore, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) suggest that inequality tends to affect 
public’s trust. Trust in others is an implication of economic equality. When resources 
are distributed unequally, people at the different rungs of the economic ladder perceive 
that they do not share the same fate and therefore, the trust between people of different 
backgrounds is severely curtailed. Hence, people who are distrustful of others tend to 
be less likely to participate in a wide range of activities including civic participation and 
political engagement (Boeckmann and Tyler 2002; Uslaner and Brown 2005). 
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Furthermore, Marsden (1987), McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) point out 
that in fragmented societies individuals tend to associate with those who are similar to 
them. Hence, income inequality tends to work against political discourse since makes it 
difficult for groups of individuals from different rungs of social strata to come into 
contact (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004; Leighley 1990). Finally, as inequality is 
associated with social exclusion, socially excluded groups are less likely to be mobilized 
than others. 
In addition, the resource theory that suggests that the level of political engagement 
and electoral participation depends on the resources, money and political skills, people 
have (Verba, Lehman Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Hence, a priori, changes in 
inequality would not necessarily have an impact on turnout. An increase in economic 
inequality may lead to an increase or decrease of turnout, depending on the income 
changes in absolute terms. Specifically, if all income groups are getting richer in 
absolute terms, then electoral participation will increase due to more resources, even if 
the poorest are getting poorer in relative terms, so inequality increases. 
Contrary to the conflicting predictions of the above theories there appears to be 
some consensus in the empirical literature which highlights that economic inequality 
have an adverse effect on electoral participation. Political participation increases with 
income, so higher-income individuals are more likely to participate in the electoral 
process (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Furthermore, the political weight may not 
necessarily be a function of absolute income, but rather of voter’s rank in the income 
distribution (Bénabou 2000). Thus, Goodin and Drysek (1980) point out that political 
power is highly determined by economic power thus the relatively poor are alienated 
from political participation and show that across countries Gini coefficient is inversely 
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related to voter turnout. This finding is further supported by a number of studies where 
inequality is found to be associated with declining electoral participation within a 
country, or across regions or advanced industrialized countries (Boix 2003; Dahl 2006; 
Mahler 2002; Merrifield 1993; Lister 2007). More recently, Solt (2008) uses individual 
level survey data for several Western countries to conclude that individuals living in 
more unequal societies are less likely to vote and, importantly, he shows that aggregate 
inequality affect the electoral participation of the poor far more than that of the rich.  
However, an important implication of the above is that declining electoral 
participation should be expected to feedback to the level of inequality. One should 
consider that a key characteristic of a democracy is that the government should respond 
to the preferences of the citizens who are considered as political equals (Dahl 1971). 
However, all citizens are not considered as political equals by policy-makers. It is by now 
well established (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Lehman Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995) that there is a disparity in political participation based on the position of 
the individual or group in the economic strata and that inequality in political activity is 
associated with inequalities in the responsiveness of the political establishment. It 
appears that the political process evolves in ways that on one hand favors those at the 
higher rungs of the income distribution and, on the other, disfavor the interests of 
those with modest means. Low-income citizens receive considerably worse 
representation of their preferences (Bartels 2008; Flavin 2012; Gilens 2012; Gilens and 
Page 2014; Rigby and Wright 2013). First, lobbying activities by corporations and 
business and professional organizations outperform public interest groups and trade 
unions the membership of which has sharply declined over the past several decades. 
Second, notwithstanding that wealthier and well-educated individuals are more likely to 
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have more well-formulated and well-informed preferences compared to the poor and 
the less-educated; the poor are also less likely to turn out to vote or to participate in the 
political process. Hence, disparities in political capital and action downgrade the value 
of the social groups at the lower rungs of income distribution for the political 
establishment.  
In effect, the higher the inequality the less the voting turnout is. This causes a 
reduction of the ability of those at the lower rungs of the income distribution to 
promote their economic interests. This, in turn, further increases inequality. Hence, 
“rising economic inequality will solidify longstanding disparities in political voice and 
influence, and perhaps exacerbate such disparities” (Task Force on Inequality and 
American Democracy 2004, pp. 662). 
A number of studies have investigated how electoral participation affects 
government policies related to welfare and redistribution. This literature reveals that 
average electoral turnout is positively related to government redistribution in developed 
democracies (Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Brady 2009; Iversen 2005; 
Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Lupu and Pontusson 2011; Mahler 2008), and it is 
associated with more equal distribution of income (Mueller and Stratmann 2003). 
Importantly, studies highlight that it is not only average turnout that matters, but also 
who votes. Thus, although, overall larger electoral participation reduces inequality and 
increases redistribution, there is a marked income bias in voter turnout. A greater 
income bias in turnout, i.e. greater electoral participation of the higher income rungs 
compared to the lower income groups, is negatively related to transfer redistribution 
(Mahler, Jesuit and Paradowski 2015) and positively related to income inequality (Avery 
2015). 
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Data 
To explore the relationship between electoral participation and inequality, country-
level data with information on the political and institutional arrangements, the 
economic policies pursued and the level of inequality is required. The Comparative 
Political Data Set III (CPDS III) 1990-2011 is a collection of political and institutional 
data (Armingeon et al., 2013). This data set consists of annual data for a group of 35 
OECD and/or EU-member countries for the period 1990-2011. CPDS III contains 
information on the political system and institutions, the level of electoral participation 
in the parliamentary elections, and fiscal and social policies adopted in each country. 
The key variable of interest is electoral participation defined as the voter turnout in the 
parliamentary election (lower house), as a percentages of the electorate.  
Data on inequality are obtained from OECD2, where four alternative measures are 
selected. These are the Gini coefficient, the P90/P10 ratio, the P50/P10 ratio and the 
Palma ratio. The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of 
income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly 
equal distribution, based on the comparison of cumulative proportions of the 
population against cumulative proportions of income they receive. It ranges between 0 
in the case of perfect equality and 100 in the case of perfect inequality.  
The Gini coefficient is perhaps the most widely used measure of inequality. It 
describes overall inequality within a particular society and can be readily used to make 
comparisons across different societies. However, it does not provide any information 
about the origin of inequality; whether it is due to the upper, middle or bottom part of 
                                                 
 
2 Source: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD 
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the distribution. Hence, two societies with very similar Gini coefficients can still have 
very different income distributions. Hence, inequality measures based on income ratios 
are also used, which may be more insightful about the origin of inequality. In contrast 
to the Gini coefficient, income ratios do not describe the whole income distribution, 
but capture two points of that distribution. The P90/P10 ratio is the ratio of the upper 
bound value of the ninth decile (the 10% of people with highest income) to that of the 
upper bound value of the first decile, and the P50/10 is defined respectively. Both 
selected income ratios refer to the bottom of the income ladder, the poorest 10%. 
Finally, the Palma ratio is the share of all income received by the 10% people with 
highest disposable income divided by the share of all income received by the 40% 
people with the lowest disposable income. It focuses on the middle 50% that tends to 
capture around 50% of Gross Net Income (Palma 2011). Descriptive statistics of the 
four inequality measures are provided in Table 1. The variables of interest are not 
available for all 35 countries in CPDS III, so the sample includes 28 countries3.  
{Table 1 here} 
Figures 1-4 provide plots of the country average of each measure of income 
inequality used in this paper. All four figures reveal that the Scandinavian countries 
have the most egalitarian distribution of income, in contrast to the USA, Japan and the 
UK at the other end of the spectrum with the highest level of income inequality. 
                                                 
 
3 Data are available for the following 28 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
UK and USA. 
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Income inequality is also high for Greece, Spain and Portugal that most severely hit by 
the repercussions of the austerity policies after the 2008 Great Recession. 
{Figures 1-4 here} 
In Figure 5, the country average of each of the four measures of inequality is plotted 
against the country average of electoral participation covering the elections during the 
period 1990-2011, along with a fitted line and the 95% confidence interval. Regardless 
to which measure of inequality is used, the data suggest a negative relationship between 
the two variables.  
{Figure 5 here} 
Empirical Strategy 
The aim of the study is to identify the mechanics driving the negative correlation 
between income inequality and political participation, as depicted in Figure 5. The a 
priori expectation is that individuals’ participation in parliamentary elections affects 
political outcomes and consequently, directly or indirectly, it influences policies that 
are related to the distribution of income within the society. In addition, existing levels 
of income inequality affect people’s decision to vote. Therefore, there is a two-way 
relationship between income inequality and political participation. However, one 
idiosyncratic feature if this relationship, is that the realization of the electoral 
participation is assessed at a specific point in time, namely during the elections, while 
the income inequality manifest itself over a period of time after the elections take place, 
implying an unspecified and staggered lagged effect. Similarly, the effects of inequality 
on the next rounds of political participation as reflected on the electoral outcome may 
also take an unspecified and staggered fashion to manifest itself. This complication 
becomes far more complex when this relationship is examined in a cross country 
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framework. Hence, this simultaneous nature of the evolution of the electoral 
participation – income inequality interrelationship cannot be modeled within the 
conventional simultaneous equations statistical context  
To circumvent this difficulty this paper resorts two independent equations, one 
describing the effect of electoral participation on inequality for the years following an 
election, and one on the effect of past inequality on political participation at the time 
of the elections. Therefore, the inequality equation can be described as 
 
𝐼i𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖𝑒 + 𝑿𝑖𝑡𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝐼  refers to inequality for country 𝑖  in the period 𝑡 . 𝑃  is the level of electoral 
participation in the latest parliamentary elections that took place in period 𝑒, where 
𝑡 > 𝑒, and 𝑿 is a vector of other covariates that captures labor market institutional 
arrangements, overall economic conditions  and redistributive polices. The inequality 
equation is estimated for the years after a parliamentary election, without considering 
the year of the election4. The term 𝑣 is the error term that consists of two components, 
an unobserved country specific and time-invariant component 𝜃𝑖 and a random error 
component 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
The electoral participation equation is described by 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑒 = 𝛿 + 𝜅𝐼𝑖𝑒−1 + 𝒀𝑖𝑒−1𝜁 + 𝑧𝑖𝑒  (2) 
                                                 
 
4 The year of the election is not considered, since income inequality measure may be calculated before or 
after the election, thus it is more difficult to discuss about causality in the election years.  
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where 𝒀  is a vector of other covariates including electoral rules, and economic 
conditions prior to the year of the election. As before, the error term 𝑧 contains an 
unobserved time-invariant country-specific component 𝜙𝑖  and a random error 
component 𝜔𝑖𝑒. The explanatory variables in the electoral participation are measured 
the year before the election took place and the equation is estimated only for the years 
where a parliamentary election took place. The simultaneous relationships between 
electoral participation and economic inequality are empirically investigated using four 
alternative estimation procedures.  
A candidate estimator for equations (1) and (2) is a fixed effects estimator that has 
the intuitive appeal of controlling for unobserved country-specific characteristics, 
especially when there is a concern that the between-group variation is contaminated 
with unobserved heterogeneity. However, one main limitation is that fixed effects 
assume that the country effect is fixed over time, an assumption that unlikely to be 
satisfied over the period of 22 years covered in the data. Furthermore, if most of the 
true variation in the variables of interest, economic inequality and electoral 
participation, is cross-sectional, the fixed-effects estimator removes the true variation, 
leaving mainly variations in possible measurement errors (Griliches and Hausman 
1986). Therefore, a potential limitation of fixed effects regression is that it cannot 
capture the effects of variables that have little within-group variation. Further, the fixed 
effects approach uses only the within-group variation. Hence, any time-invariant 
observable characteristics also difference out, so that their coefficients cannot be 
identified, with the effects of invariant factors simply combined into a single fixed 
effect. Furthermore, a further shortcoming of fixed effects estimator is that it cannot 
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remove the resulting biases from omitted relevant time-varying factors, simultaneous 
responses to idiosyncratic shocks, or measurement errors. 
An alternative estimator that addresses some of the potential limitations of the fixed 
effects is the instrumental variables approach. This method relies on the identification 
of valid instruments. The exclusion restriction conditions for valid instruments require 
instrumental variables to be correlated with the causal (suspected to be endogenous) 
variable and uncorrelated with any other determinant of the dependent variable. 
However, it is often difficult to find convincing instruments that satisfy these two 
requirements. In addition, the regression outcome can be severely biased if the chosen 
instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. A further issue is that 
the instrumental variables method assumes monotonicity that implies that the direction 
of the effect of the instrument on the endogenous variable is the same for everyone in 
the sample. Therefore, while the instrument may have no effect on a sub-group of the 
sample, “non-takers” and “always-takers”, all those who are affected, “compliers”, are 
affected in the same way. An implication of this assumption is that the estimated effect 
is the average treatment for those whose treatment status changed by the instruments 
(the compliers), this is called the local average treatment effect. Hence the instrumental 
variable regression may not be informative about treatment effects on the never-takers 
or always-takers. 
In view of the above, a third estimator this paper employs is the Mundlak (1978) 
methodology. Greene (2008) argues that Mundlak formulation retains the random 
effects specification but it also appropriately deals with the problem of any correlation 
between the unobserved effects and the regressors. In effect, the Mundlak specification 
provides a fixed effect estimator (Greene 2008, pp. 209-10; Hsiao 1989, p. 45). In 
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addition, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2002) demonstrate using Monte Carlo simulations 
that the Mundlak model provides an approximation of the temporary and permanent 
effects, when inference a dynamic model is not feasible.  Using Mundlak’s 
decomposition one can assume that a subset of the country characteristics, electoral 
participation and inequality in equations (1) and (2) respectively, are correlated with a 
part of the country random effect. This correlation operates through the mean value of 
the time-varying set of variables over the sample lifetime. The Mundlak methodology 
retains the econometrically ‘correct’ fixed-effect structure through the inclusion of the 
mean values of the regressors that are fixed for each country. This circumvents the 
problem of correlations between unobserved state-specific effects and the regressors. 
Indeed, the Mundlak methodology offers an economically interpretable fixed effect, 
since changes in this ‘fixed effect’ correspond to changes in average of the variables of 
interest.  In view of the above, the equations to be estimated are: 
 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑖𝑒 + ?̅??̅?𝑖 + 𝑿𝑖𝑡𝛾 + ?̅?𝑖?̅? + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
and  
𝑃𝑖𝑒 = 𝛿 + 𝜅𝐼𝑖𝑒−1 + ?̅?𝐼?̅? + 𝒀𝑖𝑒−1𝜁 + ?̅?𝑖𝜁̅ + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑒  (4) 
 
where ?̅?, 𝐼 ,̅ ?̅? and ?̅? are the country averages over the sample period. The estimated 
coefficients of the level variables represent the within-groups effects, whilst the between-
groups effects are identified by the coefficients of the mean variables.  
The available longitudinal data allows the decomposition of the estimated effects to 
country permanent differences in the explanatory variables and country transitory 
changes. The permanent–transitory decomposition using the Mundlak methodology is 
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appealing especially if the impact of electoral participation (inequality) on inequality 
(electoral participation) is not contemporaneous and may take a long time to manifest 
itself. The transitory and permanent effects can be identified by using the variable 
transformation, suggested by van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003) and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), which transforms equations (3) and (4) to: 
 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑃𝑖𝑒 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝛽 + ?̅?)?̅?𝑖 + (𝑿𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)𝛾 + ?̅?𝑖(𝛾 + ?̅?) + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (5) 
and  
𝑃𝑖𝑒 = 𝛿 + 𝜅(𝐼𝑖𝑒−1 − 𝐼?̅?) + (𝜅 + ?̅?)𝐼?̅? + (𝒀𝑖𝑒−1 − ?̅?𝑖)𝜁 + ?̅?𝑖(𝜁 + 𝜁)̅ + 𝜙𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖𝑒   (6) 
 
The coefficients 𝛽 , 𝛾 , 𝜅  and 𝜁  reflect the transitory effects and the coefficients 
(𝛽 + ?̅?) , (𝛾 + ?̅?) , (𝜅 + ?̅?)  and (𝜁 + 𝜁)̅  the corresponding permanent effects. 
Equations (5) and (6) are estimated by random effects.  
One potential issue with the Mundlak methodology is that there may still be 
concerns of endogeneity bias in the estimates if some independent variables, in our case 
electoral participation in equation (5) and inequality in equation (6), may correlate with 
the country-level random effect. Hausman and Taylor (1981) show that in cases, where 
there are both time-variant and time-invariant variables of interest, consistent 
estimation of the coefficients of interest is possible, if not all of the time-varying 
coefficients are correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity. The basic idea is to use 
the group means of the time-varying variables that are uncorrelated with the 
unobserved heterogeneity as instrument for the time-invariant variables to obtain 
consistent estimates of their coefficients, while consistent estimates of the time-varying 
variable coefficients can be obtained using standard fixed effects estimation. This 
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requires that there are at least as many uncorrelated, exogenous, time-varying variables 
as correlated time-invariant variables and also that there is suitable correlation between 
these. Therefore, in order to deal with the potential bias, the Hausman-Taylor approach 
is used5 on a specification very similar to the Mundlak specification to test whether the 
results are robust to this type of endogeneity. 
Results and discussion 
The effect of electoral participation on inequality 
The effect of electoral participation on income inequality is investigated empirically 
using the four identification strategies proposed above, a fixed effects regression, an 
instrumental variable with fixed effects estimator, a random effects Mundlak approach 
with transitory-permanent decomposition, and a Hausman-Taylor estimator using the 
same transitory-permanent framework. The regression specification used for the 
electoral participation, includes also controls for union membership, union density, 
employment protection strictness, unemployment rate, GDP and population growth. 
Governments can affect the distribution of income through taxation and transfers. 
Thus, tax revenue of social security funds (percentage of GDP), social benefits other 
than social transfers in kind (percentage of GDP), and total tax revenues (percentage of 
GDP) are included6 to explain the distribution of income in a country, as measured by 
the inequality measure. Similar explanatory variables are used routinely as control 
variables in the literature (e.g. Mueller and Stratmann 2003). The results are 
summarized in Table 2. 
                                                 
 
 
6 The full set of estimates is available upon request from the authors. 
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The estimates from the fixed effects regression and the instrumental variables with 
fixed effects regression are presented in the first two columns. Columns (III) and (IV) 
refer to the random effects with Mundlak terms, where there are two coefficients 
reported, one on the transitory effect of electoral participation and one on the 
permanent effect, 𝛽 and 𝛽 + ?̅? using the notation above. While the last two columns, 
(V) and (VI), present the results from the Hausman-Taylor estimator to address the 
issue of potential endogeneity bias. Table 2 is divided into four panels one for each 
income inequality measure, so in panel (i) the dependent variable is the Gini 
coefficient, whereas in panel (ii) it is the P90/P10 ratio, in panel (iii) the P50/P10 ratio, 
and in panel (iv) the Palma ratio.  
{Table 2 here} 
The results from the fixed effect regression suggest that electoral participation has a 
negative effect on all four measures of economic inequality considered. A wider 
participation in parliamentary elections is found to reduce inequality, a result that is 
consistent with the limited empirical evidence on the effect of political participation on 
economic welfare (Mueller and Stratmann 2003).  Specifically, the estimates suggest 
that an increase in electoral participation by one standard deviation leads to a 
reduction in all four measures of inequality of around twenty percent of a standard 
deviation. 
To address some of the limitations of the fixed effects estimates, the equations are 
re-estimated using an instrumental variables regression. For the first three measures of 
income inequality, the instruments used for political participation are an index of 
electoral fractionalization of the party-system, and a variable that indicates whether it is 
a parliamentary, semi-presidential, presidential or hybrid system. The instruments used 
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for the Palma ratio equation are an index of electoral fractionalization of the party-
system, a variable for consensus democracy based on Lijphart’s first dimension “Parties-
executives”, and an indicator regarding the proportionality of the electoral system. The 
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, presented in Table 2, provides 
supporting evidence on the validity of the chosen instruments. The joint null 
hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, uncorrelated with the error 
term. A rejection would cast doubt on the validity of the instruments. The estimated 
effect of electoral participation on economic inequality retains its negative sign, 
although the effect is statistically significant only when the inequality is measured by 
the Gini coefficient or the Palma ratio 7 . This result may be an outcome of the 
inevitable efficiency loss associated with the instrumental variables estimator and the 
resulting larger standard errors. Hence, it is always useful to statistically assess whether 
the instrumental variables estimation is required. To this effect under the null 
hypothesis the specified endogenous regressors can be treated as exogenous a Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity of regressors is performed and presented in Table 2. 
The results for the equations using the Gini coefficient, the P90/P10 ratio and the 
P50/P10 ratio do not provide any evidence that electoral participation is endogenous. 
It is only when economic inequality is measured by the Palma ratio that the electoral 
participation appears to be endogenous. Therefore, although the chosen exclusion 
restrictions appear to be valid instruments, there is very limited evidence that the 
                                                 
 
7 The difference in the magnitude of the estimated effects between the instrumental variables and the 
fixed effects regression may be attributed to the fact that the former estimator identifies local average 
treatment effects that correspond to the group of “compliers” only.  
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instrumental variables approach is required. These findings may also be taken to reflect 
the complicated nature of the estimated relationship discussed above. 
The estimates based on random effects with Mundlak transitory and permanent 
decomposition terms, presented in columns (III) and (IV), indicate that electoral 
participation has a transitory negative effect on income inequality, which is of similar 
magnitude to that estimated with fixed effects regression. Yet no permanent effects turn 
out to be statistically significant. This may be taken to imply that that since elections 
normally take place at frequent intervals, it is voters’ participation at the most recent 
elections that have the most significant impact. . For robustness purposes, the model is 
re-estimated using the Hausman-Taylor approach that controls for potential 
endogeneity bias in the estimated coefficients of interest. The results remain the same, 
with the evidence suggesting the existence of a transitory effect of voters’ participation 
on income inequality. The over-identification test also reported in Table 2 provides 
support to the exogeneity hypothesis of the generated instruments by the Hausman-
Taylor method. The results from the four alternative estimation strategies employed are 
remarkably robust and suggest that larger electoral participation may lead to more 
egalitarian distribution of income in the society. 
 
The effect of inequality on electoral participation 
The results regarding the effect of inequality on electoral participation are 
summarized in Table 3 that has the same structure as Table 2.  The specification of the 
estimated regression equation is comparable to models commonly used in the literature 
(e.g. Mueller and Stratmann 2003; Fumagalli and Narciso 2012). Electoral rules and 
constitutions might affect voters’ participation, thus controls for the parliamentary 
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system, compulsory voting legislation8, federalism, and proportional representation are 
included. In addition, the population growth is also included since countries with 
growing population have a relatively higher incidence of younger voters who, as 
literature shows, are expected to have lower participation (Mueller and Stratmann 
2003). Furthermore, GDP growth, and the unemployment rate are also included in the 
regressions to capture the level of economic activity for the year of the elections. 
The fixed effects results, column (I) in Table 3, suggest that individuals participate 
less in the electoral process when there is higher income inequality. Regardless to which 
measure of income inequality is considered, an increase in income inequality by one 
standard deviation results to a reduction in political participation by around 4 units, 
one third of a standard deviation. 
The results are confirmed by the instrumental variables estimates, column (II) in 
Table 3. Voters’ turnout is lower in countries with more unequal distribution of 
income. The instruments used for the Gini coefficient are the social benefits other than 
social transfers in kind (as a percentage of GDP), the percentage of women in 
parliaments, and total tax revenues (as a percentage of GDP). For the other three 
measures of income inequality the chosen instruments are the total tax revenues (as a 
percentage of GDP) and the annual deficit (as a percentage of GDP). The Sargan-
Hansen overidentification test supports the exclusion restriction conditions of the 
instruments and supports the assumption that they are uncorrelated with the error 
term. The endogeneity tests performed do not suggest that any of the four measures of 
income inequality is endogenous in the estimated electoral participation equation. 
                                                 
 
8 Source: http://www.idea.int/uid/fieldview.cfm?field=300 
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This, in turn, suggests that the use of instrumental variables is not statistically 
supported.  
The transitory and permanent effects of inequality on electoral participation are 
explored with the use of random effects regression with Mundak terms, columns (III) 
and (IV). The estimates reveal that income inequality has a negative transitory effect on 
electoral participation of similar magnitude to that estimated by fixed effects. In 
addition, there also appears to be a negative permanent inequality effect. 
As a robustness check, the model using the Hausman-Taylor approach, is estimated 
(last two columns). Although income inequality does not appear to exhibit any 
permanent effect on the electoral participation the negative transitory effect is 
statistically significant. In addition, the over-identification test supports the exogeneity 
hypothesis of the identifying restrictions.   
{Table 3 here} 
The empirical evidence offered in this paper suggests that when there is higher 
income inequality, there is lower electoral participation (Table 3). Lower electoral 
participation is found to increase income inequality (Table 2).  
The above results from both the estimated equations taken together reveal that there 
is a vicious cycle where unequal distribution of income leads to more inequality 
through reducing the electoral participation of the poorer groups in a society. As the 
estimates suggest, an increase in income inequality by a standard deviation will trigger a 
reduction to electoral participation by one third of a standard deviation which itself 
will lead to a further increase in income inequality of around 10 percent of a standard 
deviation. This highlights John Stuart Mill’s argument (1861) that unless there is a 
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proportional representation of all people, the government will serve the interests of a 
privileged minority.  
Conclusion 
Over the last three decades there has been a notable increase in economic inequality 
accompanied by a decline in political participation in many advanced countries. A 
number of studies in the economics and politics literature explore this negative 
association between inequality and political participation. This paper explores whether 
there is mechanism of self-reinforcing economic inequality through the political 
inactivity and exclusion of people from the democratic processes, as proposed by 
Bartels (2008). The evidence suggests that although wider participation in 
parliamentary elections reduces economic inequality, more disperse distribution of 
income has an adverse effect on electoral participation. The empirical results therefore 
imply that there is an interrelationship where economic inequality leads to lower 
political participation, which subsequently leads to greater inequality. This study 
contributes to the recent literature on the self-reinforcing nature of economic 
inequality (Kelly and Enns, 2010; Barth, Finseraas, and Moene 2015) by highlighting a 
mechanism linking income inequality and electoral participation, that of political 
exclusion. Democratic processes are fundamental for the existence of egalitarian 
societies. However, unless there is wide participation in the political process from all 
the segments of the society and all rungs of the socio-economic ladder, inequitable 
distribution of income will perpetuate. 
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Tables and figures 
Table1: Descriptive statistics 
 Mean (SD) Definition 
Gini 
29.427 
(4.228) 
The Gini coefficient is based on the comparison of 
cumulative proportions of the population against 
cumulative proportions of income they receive, and it 
ranges between 0 in the case of perfect equality and 100 
in the case of perfect inequality 
P90/P10 
3.744 
(0.778) 
The P90/P10 ratio is the ratio of the upper bound value 
of the ninth decile (i.e. the 10% of people with highest 
income) to that of the upper bound value of the first 
decile 
P50/P10 
1.991 
(0.241) 
The P50/P10 ratio is the ratio of the median income to 
that of the upper bound value of the first decile 
Palma ratio 
1.090 
(0.223) 
The Palma ratio is the share of all income received by 
the 10% people with highest disposable income divided 
by the share of all income received by the 40% people 
with the lowest disposable income 
Electoral participation 
69.904 
(13.101) 
Voter turnout in the latest parliamentary election 
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Table 2: The effect of electoral participation on income inequality 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
 FE IV-FE RE Mundlak  RE Hausman–Taylor 
 Overall Overall Transitory Permanent Transitory Permanent 
(i) Inequality measure: Gini coefficient 
Electoral participation -0.052** -0.119* -0.043** -0.037 -0.042** -0.019 
 (-2.37) (-1.82) (-2.06) (-0.66) (-2.01) (-0.24) 
Overidentification test (X2)  0.340 
  
9.638 
 
Endogeneity test (X2)  0.560 
    
N 190 187 186 
 
186 
 
(ii) Inequality measure: P90/P10 
Electoral participation -0.013*** -0.008 -0.013*** -0.009 -0.013*** -0.018 
 (-2.84) (-0.67) (-2.68) (-1.08) (-2.83) (-1.54) 
Overidentification test (X2)  0.034 
  
9.563 
 
Endogeneity test (X2)  0.159 
    
N 158 155 154 
 
154 
 
(iii) Inequality measure: P50/P10 
Electoral participation -0.004** -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004** -0.006* 
 (-2.27) (-0.85) (-1.50) (-1.44) (-2.22) (-1.69) 
Overidentification test (X2)  0.017 
  
9.772 
 
Endogeneity test (X2)  0 
    
N 158 155 154 
 
154 
 
(iv) Inequality measure: Palma ratio 
Electoral participation -0.004*** -0.007* -0.004** -0.003 -0.004** -0.006 
 (-2.68) (-1.88) (-2.42) (-1.02) (-2.41) (-1.53) 
Overidentification test (X2)  2.177 
  
9.701 
 
Endogeneity test (X2)  5.061** 
    
N 158 123 154 
 
154 
 
Notes: (i) The table reports coefficients with t statistics in parentheses; (ii) the level of significance is denoted as 
follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0. 01; (iii) controls for union membership and union density, employment 
protection strictness, unemployment rate, GDP growth, population growth, revenue of social security funds 
(percentage of GDP), social benefits other than social transfers in kind (percentage of GDP), and total tax 
revenues (percentage of GDP) are also included. 
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Table 3: The effect of income inequality on electoral participation 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
 FE IV-FE RE Mundlak  RE Hausman–Taylor 
 Overall Overall Transitory Permanent Transitory Permanent 
(i) Electoral Participation 
Gini(t-1) -1.065*** -1.524*** -1.025*** -1.315** -1.030*** -1.22 
 (-2.72) (-2.61) (-2.79) (-2.58) (-2.60) (-1.12) 
Overidentification test 
(X2) 
 1.77 
  
2.809 
 
Endogeneity test (X2)  0.645 
    
N 84 79 84 
 
84 
 
(ii) Electoral Participation 
P90/P10(t-1) -5.073*** -6.246*** -4.963*** -7.605*** -4.923*** -3.743 
 (-3.52) (-3.11) (-3.59) (-3.36) (-3.30) (-0.80) 
Overidentification test 
(X2) 
 0.226 
  
2.701 
 
Endogeneity test (X2)  0.64 
    
N 68 63 68 
 
68 
 
(iii) Electoral Participation 
P50/P10(t-1) -12.68*** -17.53*** -12.72*** -25.04*** -12.43*** -7.351 
 (-3.18) (-3.01) (-3.32) (-3.44) (-2.93) (-0.38) 
Overidentification test 
(X2) 
 0.138 
  
2.587 
 
Endogeneity test (X2)  0.7102 
    
N 68 63 68 
 
68 
 
(iv) Electoral Participation 
Palma ratio(t-1) -17.668*** -20.337** -17.430*** -25.745*** -17.287*** -17.857 
 (-3.74) (-2.83) (-3.92) (-2.93) (-3.58) (-1.10) 
Overidentification test 
(X2) 
 2.295 
  
2.235 
 
Endogeneity test (X2)  0.225 
    
N 68 63 68 
 
68 
 
Notes: (i) The table reports coefficients with t statistics in parentheses; (ii) the level of significance is denoted as 
follows: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; (iii) controls for parliamentary system, compulsory voting legislation, 
federalism, proportional representation, unemployment rate (at t-1), GDP growth (at t-1), and population growth 
(at t-1) are also included. 
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Figure 1: Gini coefficient 
 
Notes: Country averages of Gini coefficient for the period 
1990-2011, based on authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 3: P50/P10 ratio 
 
Notes: Country averages of P50/P10 ratio for the period 
1990-2011, based on authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: P90/P10 ratio 
 
Notes: Country averages of P90/P10 ratio for the period 
1990-2011, based on authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 4: Palma ratio 
 
Notes: Country averages of Palma ratio for the period 
1990-2011, based on authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5: Inequality and electoral participation 
 
Notes: Country mean income inequality plotted with country mean electoral participation for the 
period 1990-2011, observation points with fitted line and 95% confidence interval, based on authors’ 
calculations. 
 
 
 
